

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 016886

R 021710Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9041

INFO USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

S E C R E T BRUSSELS 6243

EXDIS

EO 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, EEC, US

SUB: ATLANTIC RELATIONS

1. SUMMARY; IN MY VIEW, A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO EUROPE IN THE NEAR FUTURE WOULD DEFINITELY SERVE US INTERESTS. SUCH A VISIT WOULD, PRESUMABLY NOT TAKE PLACE, HOWEVER, IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ASSURED SUBSTANTIVE ACHIEVEMENT THAT CAN BE ENDORSED PUBLICLY BY THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. THE US/EC DIALOGUE IS UNLIKELY TO PRODUCE EITHER THE SUBSTANCE OR THE FORUM REQUISITE TO A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT. THE FRENCH DRAFT OF A NATO DECLARATION, ON THE OTHER HAND, OFFERS HOPE FOR A FINAL DOCUMENT SUFFICIENTLY IMPORTANT AND SUBSTANTIVE TO WARRANT A VISIT, AND A SUMMIT MEETING OF NATO COUNTRIES IS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY. I BELIEVE THE US SHOULD THEREFORE NOW FOCUS ON NATO AND CONCENTRATE ON INCLUDING IN THE NATO DECLARATION A GENERALIZED BUT CLEAR AND AFFIRMATIVE STATEMENT ON THE BURDENSARING ISSUE. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, THE US WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO REVISE SOMEWHAT ITS CONCEPT OF THE ELEMENTS TO BE CONSIDERED IN A BURDENSARING SOLUTION. BY NO MEANS DO I WISH TO UNDERSTATE, HOWEVER, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE US/EC DIALOGUE OR THE DECLARATION THAT IS EMERGING IN THAT CONTEXT. END SUMMARY.

2. AT THE OBVIOUS RISK OF ECHOING CONCLUSIONS THAT MAY WELL HAVE BEEN REACHED INDEPENDENTLY IN WASHINGTON, I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER  
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MY OWN VIEWS AS THEY HAVE EVOLVED IN THE COURSE OF OBSERVING US-EUROPEAN INTERACTION SINCE THE SECRETARY'S APRIL 23 SPEECH.

3. I BELIEVE THAT A VISIT BY PRESIDENT NIXON TO EUROPE IS NOW,

MORE THAN EVER, HIGHLY DESIRABLE, BOTH TO CEMENT PROGRESS MADE

TO DATE ON US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS AND TO REAFFIRM OUR BELIEF IN THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE RELATIONS FOLLOWING THE EMERGENCE OF EXPRESSED DOUBTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC IN THE WAKE OF RECENT MIDDLE EAST EVENTS. A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT SHOULD BE DELAYED AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE; BUT IT CAN TAKE PLACE ONLY IF A REAL SUBSTANTIVE ACHIEVEMENT AWAITS THE PRESIDENT IN EUROPE,

4. THE EMERGING US-EC NINE DECLARATION HAS OBVIOUS SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS THAT ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE OVERCOME, GIVEN THE AGONY THROUGH WHICH THE NINE SEEM TO BE PASSING, AND CONSIDERING THAT, BY DEFINITION, WE ARE AN "OUTSIDER" WHERE THE EC IS CONCERNED. COMBINED WITH THE PROBABLE REFUSAL OF THE NINE TO HAVE A US-EC MEETING WITH ALL COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING AT THE SUMMIT, THE US-EC DECLARATION, NO MATTER HOW MUCH IMPROVED IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, WILL SIMPLY NOT OFFER SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT.

5. THE FRENCH DRAFT OF A NATO DECLARATION, IF SUITABLY EXPANDED UPON, OFFERS THE BEST HOPE THAT A SUBSTANTIVE DOCUMENT WILL AWAIT THE PRESIDENT'S SIGNATURE IN EUROPE. MOREOVER, EUROPEAN RESISTANCE TO A MEETING AT THE SUMMIT IN THE NATO FRAMEWORK IS APPARENTLY LOW. WE SHOULD THEREFORE, OVER THE COMING DAYS AND WEEKS, FOCUS OUR ENERGIES ON DEVELOPING THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE NATO DECLARATION IN ANTICIPATION OF A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT.

6. THE ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL VISIT, THAT IS ONE THAT ACHIEVES SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS AND CREATES POSITIVE PUBLIC IMPACT, ARE (A) ALLIED AGREEMENT ON THE CONTINUING NEED TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE WESTERN DEFENSE, (B) ALLIED ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE RADICAL CHANGES IN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE AMONG ALLIES SINCE THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY WAS SIGNED, AND (C) EXPRESSED ALLIED WILLINGNESS TO ADJUST THE BURDENS OF DEFENSE SO AS TO MATCH THE CHANGES THAT HAVE OCCURRED AND THOSE THAT MAY COME ABOUT IN THE FUTURE.

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7. IN SHORT, THE ALLIES MUST COMMIT THEMSELVES TO THE PROPOSITION THAT NO COUNTRY SHOULD SUFFER PERSISTENT BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DISADVANTAGES AS A RESULT OF ITS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMON DEFENSE EFFORT. THE INCLUSION OF SUCH A COMMITMENT IN PRINCIPLE IN A DECLARATION SIGNED BY FIFTEEN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT CAN SERVE AS A CLEAR AND URGENT MANDATE TO ALLIES TO DEVISE AN EQUITABLE MULTILATERAL BURDENSARING SCHEME DESIGNED TO COVER THE PRESENT SITUATION AS WELL AS ANY FUTURE REALIGNMENTS IN ALLIED ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES. I BELIEVE THAT THE US MUST BE WILLING TO COMMIT ITSELF TO APPLYING SUCH AGREED STANDARDS SHOULD WE EVER FIND OURSELVES IN A FAVORABLE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SITUATION VIS-A-VIS OUR ALLIES, AS WE DID WITHOUT SPECIFIC AGREEMENT TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AGO. IN SUM, I AM SUGGESTING A

BURDENSARING FORMULA THAT INTRODUCES A DEGREE OF AUTOMATICITY WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE CHANGES IN THE COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS OF THE ALLIES.

8. OUR LEVERAGE ON THE FRENCH IN NATO IS, TO SAY THE LEAST, INFINITELY GREATER THAN IT IS IN THE US-EC CONTEXT. REPEATED FRENCH CALLS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF US FORCE LEVELS IN EUROPE PROVIDE US WITH A BARGAINING TOOL SO FORMIDABLE THAT THE IMPLIED THREAT OF WITHDRAWAL NEED NEVER BE PUT EXPLICITLY. THE FRENCH DRAFT OF A NATO DECLARATION SEEMS TO CONTAIN THE NECESSARY PRIMARY INGREDIENTS FOR FASHIONING A SATISFACTORY BURDENSARING STATEMENT. ("WESTERN EUROPE...HAS OBTAINED AN UNPRECEDENTED LEVEL OF PROSPERITY"; "THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (SHOULD) UNDERTAKE TO MAKE THE NECESSARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO KEEP THE COMMON DEFENSE EFFORT..."; DETENTE HAS NOT REDUCED THE NEED FOR SECURITY.)

9. IN VIEW OF JACKSON-NUNN AND ITS CLEARLY OBSERVABLE EFFECT IN EUROPE, WE MIGHT DO BEST TO FOCUS FIRST ON BALANCE OF PAYMENTS RATHER THAN STRICTLY BUDGETARY PROBLEMS IN OUR APPROACH TO BURDENSARING. I THINK WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AMONG ALLIES DO NOT REPRESENT THE ONLY CHANGE THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE OVER THE YEARS: COMMERCIAL MILITARY SALES HAVE TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT REPLACED GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT TRANSACTIONS AND MUST PROBABLY BE ENTERED INTO THE CALCULATION IF EUROPEANS ARE SERIOUSLY TO CONSIDER OUR PROPOSALS. IT WILL OTHERWISE BE MOST DIFFICULT TO MAKE THE POINT THAT 20 YEARS AGO WE "BOUGHT EUROPEAN" IN PART TO HELP  
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REDRESS THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DISPARITIES EXISTING AT THAT TIME.

10. IN SUBMITTING THESE VIEWS, I HAVE NO INTENTION OF DOWNPLAYING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CURRENT US-EC DIALOGUE AND THE EFFORT TO PRODUCE A COMMON DECLARATION WITH THE NINE. ON THE CONTRARY, I BELIEVE PROGRESS IN THIS AREA TO BE OF SUPREME IMPORTANCE, PARTICULARLY WITH AN EYE TO US RELATIONS WITH EUROPE IN THE MEDIUM TO LONG TERM. IN THE SHORT TERM, HOWEVER, IT IS TO NATO THAT WE MUST LOOK FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A PLATFORM STRONG ENOUGH TO SUPPORT A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT: WE ARE A FULL MEMBER; WE EXERCISE MAXIMUM LEVERAGE ON THE FRENCH AND OTHERS IN THIS FORUM; AND ONLY IN THIS FORUM CAN THE CRUCIAL PROBLEM OF BURDENSARING BE RESOLVED. STRAUSS-KHAN

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 11 MAY 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** FOREIGN RELATIONS, POLITICAL SITUATION, VISITS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 02 NOV 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** boyleja  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973BRUSSE06243  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** A NATO DECLARATION SEEMS TO CONTAIN THE NECESSARY  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** P750023-1464  
**From:** BRUSSELS  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19731166/abqceey.tel  
**Line Count:** 156  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS ONLY  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS ONLY  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** boyleja  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 14 AUG 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <14-Aug-2001 by kellerpr>; APPROVED <26-Sep-2001 by boyleja>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** n/a  
**TAGS:** PFOR, US, BE, NATO  
**To:** STATE INFO NATO BRUSSELS  
**EC BRUSSELS**  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005